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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






EDWARD D. TORRES,  
a/k/a Rev. Eddie Torres, 




SARA DAVIS, Board of Education of Camden Public Schools;  
DANA REDD, Mayor of Camden; 
COMMISSIONER NEW JERSEY BOARD OF EDUCATION;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-06190) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant 
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 16, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 4, 2012) 
_________ 
 






 Edward Torres, proceeding pro se, appeals an order from the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey granting the motions to dismiss of Sara Davis, the 
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and the Commissioner of the State of New 
Jersey Board of Education.  Torres also appeals the District Court’s order denying his 
motion to appoint pro bono counsel.  Finally, Torres filed in this Court two separate 
motions for injunctive relief.  Because this appeal does not present a substantial question 
we will summarily affirm for largely the same reasons as given in the District Court’s 
order.  We deny Torres’s motions for injunctive relief.  
I. 
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we will 
recount only the essential facts and procedural history.  In October 2011, Torres filed a 
civil complaint in the District Court.  In his complaint Torres named Sara Davis; Dana 
Redd, Mayor of the City of Camden; the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey; 
and the Commissioner of the State of New Jersey Board of Education (the 
“Commissioner”).  Torres generally alleged that the Camden City Board of Education 
(the “Board”), of which Davis is a member, violated his civil rights when they did not 
include proposed referendum questions he had submitted in a special election ballot.  In 
particular, Torres argued that his First Amendment rights were violated, his equal 
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated, and his New Jersey 
state constitutional rights were violated.   
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Two of the referendum questions Torres proposed dealt with the addition of 
religious content to the Camden City Public Schools’ curriculum and the third addressed 
the rights of prisoners to vote in school board elections.  From 2000 to 2010, Torres 
regularly submitted proposed referendum questions to the Board.  The Board denied 
Torres’s referendum questions, concluding that the Board did not have jurisdiction to 
include them on a special election ballot and that inclusion of the questions would violate 
the United States Constitution.  Torres appealed the Board’s decision in 2005, and the 
Commissioner affirmed the decision.  Beginning in 2007, Torres amended his proposed 
referendum questions.  The amended referendum questions excluded the question about 
prisoner voting rights and reframed a question that dealt with prayer as “a session in 
prayer with one minute of silence to be used solely at the discretion of the individual.”  
The Board continued to deny Torres’s annual referendum questions.  He appealed the 
decision again in 2010 and the Commissioner affirmed.   
In his complaint, Torres sought injunctive relief directing Defendants to include 
the referendum questions in a special election and ten million dollars in damages.  
Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and (6), and in June 2012 the District Court granted Defendants’ motions to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Torres appealed and the Clerk alerted the parties that 
the appeal was being considered for summary action.  Davis responded and argued that 
summary action was appropriate and the District Court’s order should be affirmed.  
Torres did not respond to the notice of possible summary action, but did file a petition for 
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an injunction requesting the court to direct the Board to submit the referendum questions 
to the November general election ballot.  Davis responded to the petition and argued that 
Torres did not satisfy the standard for issuing an injunction.  Torres later filed a motion 
for injunctive relief directing Mayor Redd to cease restricting his First Amendment 
rights.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s decision to not appoint counsel for abuse of discretion.  See Tabron v. 
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).  Our review of the District Court’s order 
granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss is plenary.  See AT & T Corp. v. JMC 
Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006).  Plenary review requires that we accept 
as true all of the allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the allegations 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).  A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable 
to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard requires “more 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Rather, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  We may summarily 




Torres’s complaint seeks money damages for alleged violations of his 
constitutional rights.  Although he does not identify a specific basis for relief, his 
complaint may be liberally construed as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1
  See 
United States ex rel. Birnbaum v. Dolan, 452 F.2d 1078, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971).  To state a 
claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state 
law to deprive him of a right secured by the federal Constitution or federal law.  See 
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).   
The bulk of Torres’s allegations concern actions taken by Davis while a member 
of the Board and briefly address Mayor Redd’s alleged wrongdoing.  Torres made scant 
allegations concerning the conduct of the Attorney General and the Commissioner and no 
allegations concerning conduct taken outside of their official capacity. Thus, we agree 
with the District Court that the Attorney General and the Commissioner are immune from 
suit for money damages due to sovereign immunity.  U.S. Const. amend. XI; Will v. 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).   
Next, Torres did not sufficiently state a claim against the remaining defendants 
upon which relief can be granted.  Torres claimed that Defendants’ conduct, particularly 
that of Davis, violated his First Amendment right to petition government for a redress of 
a grievance, right to petition for posting of referendum questions, and the right to the free 
exercise of religion.  Torres argued that the Board’s conduct violated his petition rights, 
                                              
1
 Torres also stated that he was entitled to damages due to Defendants’ defamation and 
reckless endangerment.  However, other than his invocation of these concepts in his 
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but “[t]he Constitution does not grant to members of the public generally a right to be 
heard by public bodies making decisions of policy.”  Minn. State Bd. for Comty. Colls. v. 
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984).  Moreover, the Constitution does not mandate that 
states permit citizens “the right to pass legislation through a referendum.”  Molinari v. 
Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009).  In sum, the First Amendment does not 
guarantee citizens a right to pass legislation, but if the states provide such a right the First 
Amendment protects speech incident to that right.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-24 
(1988); Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1099 (10th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1245 (2007). 
Under New Jersey law, citizens generally cannot pass legislation through a 
referendum, but after the governing body of a municipality or county adopts a resolution 
authorizing referendum questions citizens can, as Torres attempted to do, propose 
nonbinding public questions to be included on a ballot “to ascertain the sentiment of the 
legal voters.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:37-1 (West 2011).  However, as the District Court 
noted, in this case the adoption of a resolution authorizing referendum questions such as 
Torres’s is a discretionary matter that is decided by the governing body of the City of 
Camden.  Id. at § 19:37-1 to 1.1.  The Defendants did not limit or burden Torres’s ability 
to propose referendum questions or his speech incident to his proposals.  Accordingly, 
Torres’s First Amendment rights were not violated.   
                                                                                                                                                  
request for damages he provides no allegations, discussion, or evidence in support.  
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Next, Torres’s allegation that Defendants’ conduct restricted his right to the free 
exercise of religion is insufficiently pled and the District Court was correct to dismiss the 
claim.  The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment is violated when the 
government has “placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious 
belief or practice” and no “compelling governmental interests justifies the burden.”  
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).  Torres has not come forward with 
facts that make it plausible that, by declining to approve Torres’s referendum questions, 
the Defendants placed a substantial burden on his religious beliefs or practices. 
IV.    
Torres also alleged that Defendants’ discrimination against him violated his Equal 
Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  A claim under the Equal Protection 
clause requires an allegation that the plaintiff “is receiving different treatment from that 
received by other individuals similarly situated.”  Kuhar v. Greensburg-Salem Sch. Dist., 
616 F.2d 676, 677 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980).  We agree with the District Court that Torres did 
not identify what particular class he belonged to for equal protection purposes and how 
he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals.  Thus, Torres failed to state 
a claim for violation of his Equal Protection rights upon which relief could be granted.  
Torres also alleged, but did not distinctly set forth, that Defendants violated his 
rights to equal protection and to free exercise of religion as provided by the New Jersey 
Constitution.  We agree with the District Court that Torres did not argue or establish that 
the New Jersey constitutional right to free exercise is more extensive than that guaranteed 
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by the Constitution, and therefore, for the reasons stated above he failed to state a claim.  
We also agree with the District Court that Torres failed to meet the standard for an equal 
protection claim under the New Jersey constitution.  See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 
142 (N.J. 2008).  Significantly, Torres provided conclusory accusations and no evidence 
supporting his claim. 
V. 
We next address Torres’s motion seeking an injunction directing Defendants to 
include his referendum questions on the November general election ballot, which was 
filed on September 19, 2012.  We deny Torres’s motion for an injunction because, as 
discussed above, he has not made the requisite strong showing that he would prevail on 
the merits of his appeal.
2
  NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (identifying the factors to evaluate in deciding whether to grant an injunction).  
We additionally deny Torres’s motion for an injunction directing Mayor Redd to stop 
restricting his First Amendment rights because the injunction was not first filed in the 
District Court.  See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1).  
VI. 
As this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Torres’s motions for injunctive relief are denied.   
                                              
2
 Additionally, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Torres’s motion for appointment of pro bono counsel.  Further, to the extent that Torres 
requests counsel on appeal, the motion is denied.  
